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Charming a Snake: Open Source Strategies
for Developing Countries Disillusioned with
TRIPs
Daniel F. Olejko*
I.

Introduction

As the phase-in period for implementation of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' ("TRIPs") has
reached expiration,2 developing countries continue to scramble to prepare
* J.D., The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, 2007;
B.S. Computer Science, Purdue University, 2004. 1 would like to thank Eben Moglen,
Professor of Law and Legal History at Columbia University Law School and Chairman
of the Software Freedom Law Center, for his assistance in surmising the topic. In March
2006, this comment was awarded the Richard R. Baxter award in recognition of writing
excellence in international law.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs].
2. The agreement provides for "Transitional Arrangements" for WTO members
based on level of development. Id. at pt. VI. TRIPs granted "developed countries" one
year to implement the TRIPs provisions. Id. at art. 65. "Developing countries" were
allowed a longer period extending until January 1, 2000. Id. TRIPs provided the "least
developed countries" the longest transition period expiring on January 1, 2006. Id. at art.
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for the inevitable reality of compliance. However, rather than fully
endorse the agreement inspired by the United States and European
Community, disillusioned developing countries have considered
alternative practices to circumvent and supplement the TRIPs
protections.3 The inspiration for these alternatives is a manifestation of
the recent crosscurrents of resistance to international intellectual
property.4 However, the resistance is not unified; competing regimes
have formed among the diverse group of World Trade Organization
("WTO") participants and even among the subgroup of developing
countries.5 Fundamentally, the split is the product of a power struggle
over competing interests and values.6 The goal of the resistance: a
restructured, legitimate agreement embracing common social,
environmental, and economic values of the entire WTO membership. 7
Reacting to "increased tensions between intellectual property
protection standards and the principles, norms, and rules of other
international regimes,"'8 some governments have implemented the
practice of abandonment. 9 Abandonment rejects multilateral agreements
such as TRIPs and resorts to "protection outside of the international
intellectual property regime."' 0 These rights holders choose to evade
underlying intellectual property law through the formation of contractual
private agreements." Contract law provides greater control to rights
holders in the protection of their intellectual assets and allows
governments to2 advance their internationally underrepresented policy
considerations.
66.
3. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime,38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 408 (2004).
4. See id.at 375 (identifying and explaining the practices of divergent international
crosscurrents: reciprocization, diversification, bilateralism, non-nationalization, and
abandonment).
5. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New
Dynamics of InternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004)
(explaining regime theory including the causal factors at play and the consequences of
regime formation).
6. Id. at 7.
7. NGOs Demand 'Re-Thinking' on TRIPs, 21 S. BULL. 3, 3 (2001) (noting how
"little, if any, of TRIPs' promised benefits of technology transfer, innovation and
increased foreign direct investment has materialized").
8. Heifer, supra note 5, at 27.
9. Yu, supra note 3, at 406.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Article 27.3(B), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 18, IP/C/W/434 (Nov. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter U.S. Submission] (advocating contractual agreements to developing
countries seeking to protect and benefit from their indigenous knowledge and materials).
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For example, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has proposed
dropping Microsoft Office in favor of alternative office applications that
utilize an open file standard such as the Open Document
Format (*.odf). 13 Unlike Microsoft's Office file format (*.doc, *.xls,
etc.), which has been traditionally kept secret,' 4 open formats are
released to the public via reference schemas.15 As its hosted reason for
adopting open formats, Massachusetts cites the need for "ease of
access."'

6

It explains:

Ease of access to electronic records created in proprietary formats is
limited in time. Once the proprietary vendor abandons a particular
version of an application or format, documents created and formatted
in those applications and formats may become inaccessible to all
readers. The proprietary formats supported by our current office
applications may place a permanent lock on future access.17
While the Massachusetts announcement is a unique example of
governmental regulation of software file formats in the United States,1 8 it
is hardly alone in the international sphere. 19 Governments around the
13. Martin LaMonica, Massachusettsto Adopt 'Open' Desktop, ZDNET NEWS, Sept.
1, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5845451.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
The final version as adopted December 29, 2006 can be found at
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=itdsubtopic&L=4&LO=Home&L =Policies%2C+Standar
ds+%26+Guidance&L2=Enterprise+Architecture&L3=Enterprise+Technical+Reference
+Model+-+Service-Oriented+Architecture+(ETRM+v3.6)&sid=Aitd.
For
more
information about the Open Document Format see http://www.oasis-open.org/
committees/tchome.php?wg-abbrev=office (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
14. Microsoft has announced it will license the file formats used in the latest editions
of its office applicants on a royalty-free basis. Martin LaMonica, Microsoft Pries Open
Office 2003, ZDNET NEWS, Nov. 17, 2003, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_225108018.html?tag=al (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
15. Both the Open Document and Microsoft formats utilize XML schemas. See
David Berlind, Top Open Source Lawyer Blesses New Terms on Microsoft's XML File
Format, ZDNET BLOGs, Nov. 28, 2005, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/index.php?p=2192
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006). XML schemas define the "structure, content and semantics of
XML documents," WC3 XML Schema, http://www.w3.org/XML/Schema (last visited
Jan. 23, 2006), at a high level of abstraction "allow[ing] machines to carry out rules made
by people." Id.
16. ETRM v. 3.5: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=
itdterminal&L=3&LO=Home&L 1=Open+Initiatives&L2=OpenDocument&sid=Aitd&b =
terminalcontent&f=policies-standardsopendocformfaqs&csid=Aitd (last visited July 2,
2007) [hereinafter ETRM FAQ].
17. Id.
18. See Declan McCullagh, Perspective: The Politics of Open-Source Software,
CNET NEWS.COM, July 14, 2003, http://news.com.com/2010-1071_3-1025268.html (last
visited Nov. 25, 2005) (acknowledging over 70 other proposals in U.S. state capitals).
19. The French, German, Spanish, South Korean, and Chinese governments as well
as the European Community have all considered legislation or projects implementing free
software alternatives in place of proprietary software. Paul Festa, Governments Push
Open-Source Software, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 29, 2001, http://news.com.com/
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world are rallying behind cries of "software libre!,, 20 The movement's
strongest support and largest concentration of countries lies in South
America where Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela have
displayed wide acceptance of open source software in both government
and industry. 21 Each country has unique reasons for jumping on the
bandwagon.22
As emerging countries become increasingly interested in the largescale deployment of open source software for practical reasons,23 they
may also be inspired by its theoretical and mechanical underpinnings.
The open source legal scheme may be adapted to allow protection in
areas unrepresented by the current international intellectual property
regime. To what extent are developing countries dissatisfied with the
protections of the current system and how could open source software
possibly save them?
This paper will analyze the implications of the emergence of the
open source movement in the crosscurrents of the international
intellectual property regime and provide an alternate solution for
Part II will provide background
concerned developing countries.
information to the complex legal issues involved. Further, it will
examine the genesis and current state of the open source community in
the United States. This background will be followed by a general
discussion of TRIPs, its formation, and its current status in the world
community. Finally, this part will provide a thorough discussion of the
impact of TRIPs and the international intellectual property regime on
developing countries.
Part III will present alternatives for developing countries
disillusioned by the existing international intellectual property system.
This discussion will be followed by an alternative solution for
developing countries partly inspired by the open source movement. It
will present a strategy for these countries to overcome the hardships of
TRIPs by utilizing existing intellectual property law to further
Governments+push+open-source+software/2 100-1001_3-272299.html (last visited Jan.
23, 2006). See also David Jackson, ICT Project Tests the Waters, BUSINESS DAY, Aug.
24, 2005, 2005 WLRN 13416707 (reporting on a South African open source project);
Venkatesh Hariharan, Why Linux Makes Sense for India, SLASHDOT, Jan. 30, 2000,
(last visited Nov. 25, 2005)
http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=00/01/30/1042201
(explaining why Linux best suits India's language needs).
20. Festa, supra note 15.
21. Robin Bloor, South America Goes Open Source, IT-ANALYSIS.coM, Feb. 10,
2005, http://www.it-analysis.com/article.php?articleid=12563 (last visited Nov. 25,
2005).
22. Id.
23. Ingrid Marson, Open Source: Developing Markets and Anti-Americanism,
ZDNET UK, Nov. 14, 2005, http://insight.zdnet.co.uk/software/0,39020463,392367451,00.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
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underrepresented public policy and modify or supplement existing
international norms, principles, and rules. Part IV will briefly conclude.
II.

Foundational and Historical Background

This section will cover the necessary background information to
deal with the above issues. First, it will explain the birth and evolution
of the open source community in the United States. Second, it will
describe the birth of the international intellectual property regime, its
goals, protections, and current state. Finally, it will consider the impact
of the system on developing countries and the resulting undercurrents of
dissent.
A.

The Open Source Movement

The open source movement has become a growing pain for
proprietary software giants such as Microsoft. 24 For others like IBM, it
has become a new and profitable method of software development that
pleases both developers and customers. 25 For purists, it has become the
movement of a generation.26
1.

Founding Principles and Methodologies

Richard Stallman created GNU,27 the project credited with starting
the free software movement,28 in the early 1980s at MIT's Artificial
24. Eileen Yu, Microsoft's Eye on Open Source, CNET NEWS.COM, July 20, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Microsofts+eye+on+open+source/2008-1082_3-5796496.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006).
25. Stephen Shankland, IBM: Linux Investment Nearly Recouped, CNET NEWS.COM,
Jan. 29, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1001-825723.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
26. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS
OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 31 (2002).

27. "The GNU Project was launched.., to develop a complete UNIX like operating
system which is free software.. " The GNU Operating System, http://www.gnu.org/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006) ("GNU is a recursive acronym for 'GNU's Not UNIX'; it is
pronounced 'guh-noo', 'noo' being like the American 'new'."). GNU is not synonymous
with Linux. While most GNU implementations run the Linux kernel, GNU is actively
developing its own kernel project, Hurd.
The GNU Hurd, http://www.gnu.org/
software/hurd/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
28. "'Free software' is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the concept, you
should think of 'free' as in 'free speech,' not as in 'free beer."' STALLMAN, supra note
26, at 41. At this point it is appropriate to distinguish between "free software" and "open
source." The obvious definition of "open source" is publicly available source code. The
non-profit corporation Open Source Initiative maintains a more detailed definition
equivalent to a licensing scheme. See Open Source Initiative OSI-The Open Source
Definition, http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
The free software community considers the "open source" requirement just one piece of a
larger puzzle. Its focus is on the fundamental freedoms associated with free software.
"Open source is a development methodology; free software is a social movement."
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Intelligence Lab.29 When Stallman began work at the lab in 1971,
developers regularly distributed source code with software. 30 Access to
source code allowed Stallman to collaborate with his co-workers to
analyze, modify, and cannibalize software.31
In the early 1980s, software companies began to distribute operating
systems under proprietary licensing schemes. 32 Under a proprietary
licensing scheme, users must agree to the terms defined by the software
vendor. 33 Terms typically limit the user's rights to transfer, modify, and
use the software and restrict access to source code. 34 Because of his
35
frustration with the restrictions of the new proprietary licensing system,
Stallman created the GNU Project premised on the idea that users should
be able to freely share software within a cooperating community.3 6
Stallman considers software "free software" if it grants users the
following four freedoms:
*
The freedom to run the program fo. any purpose;
*
The freedom to change and modify the program;
" The freedom to copy and share the program;
37
The freedom to share improved versions of the program.
*
These freedoms are absolute; there may be "no restrictions on how these
freedoms can be exercised. 3 8
Stallman's freedoms ensure the
39
collaborative development process of the open source community.
These "development communities exploit the power of peer review to

STALLMAN, supra note

29.

30.

26, at 55.
Id. at 15.
Id. Source code is defined as a series of human-readable statements written in

computer programming language. TAN TZE MENG, THE CASE FOR OPEN SOURCE, OSS vS.

PROPRIETARY
SOFTWARE 4 (2003), available at http://opensource.mimos.my/
fosscon2003cd/paper/full-paper/tan tze meng.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).

31.
32.

STALLMAN,

33.

Michael Barr, Know Your Rights, EMBEDDED SYSTEMS PROGRAMMING, Sept.

supra note 26, at 15.

Id. at 15-16.

2000, at 80, availableat http://www.netrino.com/Articles/OpenSource/ (last visited Jan.
23, 2006).
34. Id. For example, see the Microsoft Windows End-User License Agreement
forbidding users to "install, use, access, display and run [Windows]", Microsoft Windows
XP Home Edition (Retail) End-User License Agreement for Microsoft Software,
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/home/eula.mspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2006)
[hereinafter Microsoft EULA], on multiple computers or "reverse engineer, decompile, or
disassemble [Windows]," and allowing a one-time permanent transfer provided the
transferor completely removes and retains no copies of the software. Id.
35. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 17.
36. Id. at 15, 17.
37. DANIEL RAVICHER & DAVID TURNER, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., THE GPL AND
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FREE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 1 (2005) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS
OF FSD].

38. Id. at 2.
39. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 41-42.
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facilitate the debugging process of feature enhancement. 4 0 This peer
review process results in projects "generally characterized by rapid,
incremental release schedules, in which limited extra functionality is
added in each release. 4 1 While this solution may appear to be
paradoxical, consider the parallel drawn by Professor Lawrence Lessig
between software development and the legal system of a free society:
A "free society" is regulated by law. But there are limits that any
free society places on this regulation through law: No society that
kept its laws secret could ever be called free .... Law controls. But

it does so justly only when visibly. And law is visible only when its
terms are knowable and controllable by those it regulates, or by the
agents of those it regulates (lawyers, legislatures).

The ideals of freedom, of life within a free society, demand more
than [the] efficient application [of law]. Instead, openness and
transparency are the constraints within which a legal system gets
built, not options to be added if convenient to the leaders. Life
governed by software code should be no less.
Code writing is not litigation. It is better, richer, more productive.
But the law is an obvious instance of how creativity and incentives
do
42
not depend upon perfect control over the products created.
Free software may be distributed at any price and is distinguishable
from "freeware '' 43 and "shareware., 44 Likewise, free software is not noncommercial.45 In fact, commercial development of free software is a
multi-billion dollar industry in the United States.4 6 Free software has
been successfully integrated into the software industry via several
business models.
Often companies use free software in-house,
47
distributing the software throughout the enterprise for use among staff.

40. JOSEPH FELLER & BRIAN FITZGERALD, UNDERSTANDING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT 24 (2002).

41.

Id.

STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 10-11.
43. "Freeware" is software typically distributed free of charge without source code
and carries a restrictive license. Barr, supra note 33, at 80.
44. "Shareware" is software typically obtained free of charge that provides users
with a trial version of a proprietary program. Id. Usually, the trial is for a fixed period of
time after which payment is required. Id.
45. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 41.
46. Robert McMillan, Linux Server Sales Top $1 Billion in Q3, COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.computerworld.com/hardwaretopics/hardware/server/story/
0,10801,9784 1,00.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
47. LEGAL ASPECTS OF FSD, supra note 37, at 57.

42.
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Other companies, such as IBM and Red Hat,48 generate substantial
revenue from the sale of customized free software packages. 49 The most
popular free software business model provides distributions free of
charge, but offers customer support, service, and software improvement
contracts for a fee. 50 Finally, some companies re-license free software
as
5'
packages.
those
of
sale
the
from
profit
generate
and
proprietary
Free software advocates insist that there is no natural right to
intellectual property ownership. The Constitution permits but does not
require a system of copyright and patent protection.5 3 The Constitution
only grants exclusive rights over intellectual property for a temporary
period.54 The object of copyright and patent protection is not to reward
authors and inventors,55 but to promote progress and the useful arts by
creating an incentive to innovate.56 However, this purpose becomes
frustrated by the economic consequences of monopolies in the software
industry.57
Further, copyright protection creates economic inefficiency in the
software market.58 Efficiency is maximized when products sell at the
marginal cost of production. 59 The monopoly provided to copyright

48. Red Hat was founded in 1993 and is an industry leader in open source solutions
through Linux operating platforms and services ranging from consulting and support to
training programs. See Red Hat Company Profile, http://www.redhat.com/en-us/USA/
home/company/companyprofile/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
49.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF FSD, supra note 37, at 58.

50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.

STALLMAN, supra note 266, at 77-78; see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 95 (2002) ("[W]ithout
government, in the state of nature, there would be no such thing as a 'patent' since
patents are granted for 'inventions' and inventions, 'in nature,' cannot be 'a subject of
property."'). Also relevant here is the historic philosophical debate over the traditional
concept of authorship. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE
RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 9 (2001)
(discussing how Roland Barthes' essay, The Death of the Author, defined author not as a
human being, but as "the sum of the assumptions of psychological consistency, meaning,
and unity that readers and critics ... imposed on a text").
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (patent protection expires twenty years
"from the date on which the application for the patent was filed"); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)

(2000) (copyright protection expires seventy years after the death of the author).
55.

RONALD H. BROWN & BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE

NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1995), available at http://www.ladas.com/

NII/CopyrightPurpose.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57. DEAN BAKER, OPENING DOORS AND SMASHING WINDOWS: ALTERNATIVE
MEASURES FOR FUNDING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 8 (2005), available at
http://www.cepr.net/publications/windows-2005_l 0.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).

58.
59.

Id. at3.
Id.
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holders allows holders to charge prices far above the marginal cost
because the cost of software distribution is nearly zero.6" The difference
between the monopoly price and the competitive-market price leads to a
deadweight efficiency loss. 6' By tagging software with handsome
licensing fees,6 2 proprietary vendors narrow the potential market and
exclude customers who would buy the software for marginal cost but not
for the licensed price.63
Additionally, intellectual property protection impedes the research
process, leading to wasteful duplication of efforts.64 Research is a
collaborative exercise where developers build on the ideas of colleagues
and learn from past mistakes.65 Like a free market economy,6 6 the
research process is most efficient in an environment without external
intervention.67 Freedom of information allows a resource's demand to
dictate its relevancy. 68 Thus, the free flow of information provides
researchers access to the most relevant prior work and facilitates the
most productive use of that information by making it available for public
use.
Proprietary licenses impede this process by placing severe
restrictions on the free movement of information. 69 This limits both the
quantity and quality of available sources and prevents new practitioners
from studying existing programs to
learn the useful techniques and
70
programming.
computer
of
structure
71
Before proprietary licenses became popular in the early 1980s,
software developers relied on and preferred a style of collaborative
development.7 2
Software development was evolutionary; when a
program needed a new feature, a developer would modify the source
code to include the desired functionality.73 When a feature became
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Martin LaMonica, Software Start-Ups Feel the Pinch, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 12,
2006,
http://news.com.com/Software+start-ups+feel+the+pinch/2100-1012_36026171.html?tag=st.ref.goo (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
63. BAKER, supra note 57, at 3.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Free market economics is based on the principle that the value of a resource is
determined by the balance of supply and demand. Murray N. Rothbard, FreeMarket, in
THE
CONCISE LIBRARY
OF ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/
FreeMarket.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
67. LUDWIG VON MISES, ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INTERVENTIONISM (1980),
availableat http://www.mises.org/efandi.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
68. Rothbard, supra note 66.
69. Barr, supra note 33.
70. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 126.
71. Id. at 15-16.
72. Id. at 126.
73. Id.
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overbearing or semi-autonomous, it would be cannibalized to form the
beginning of a new piece of software.74 Proprietary license restrictions
prevent the evolutionary process of software development because they
conceal the source code or restrict its use.7 5
Proprietary vendors distribute software in an executable format.76
Executable formats are nearly impossible to read or understand. 7
Hence, for decades computer scientists have used "high level"
programming languages that are human-readable, providing a level of
abstraction from the machine code. 78 The source code containing the
high level language is what proprietary software vendors keep secret
from users. 79 As a result, users who wish to customize or fix programs
must reverse engineer8 ° solutions or submit a request for an update from
the software owners. 81 This wastes an extraordinary amount of resources
and leaves users at the discretion of proprietary software vendors who
often dismiss update requests as trivial.8 2 The time developers waste
replicating tasks already performed by existing programs could be "much
more productively spent improving the original program or on other
,,83
projects.
Moreover, companies often use their control over source code to
take advantage of the computer user. 4 For example, Microsoft has
designed versions of Windows to report the user's software inventory
back to the company.85 While this may seem hardly malicious, consider
the Kazaa file-sharing program that rents out the host computer to
advertising partners 86 or Sony BMG's use of embedded anti-piracy
74. Id.
75. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 126.
76. TAN TZE MENG, THE CASE FOR OPEN SOURCE, OSS vS. PROPRIETARY SOFTWARE
5 (2003), available at http://opensource.mimos.my/fosscon2003cd/paper/fuillpaper/
tan-tze meng.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
77. Id. at4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5.
80. In reality, reverse engineering is often not feasible because proprietary software
licenses often prohibit the right of the user to reverse engineer the program. See
Microsoft EULA, supra note 34. Thus, a user who wishes to implement new program
functionality is often left with the task of reinventing the wheel-producing the same
program through completely different means-which requires substantially more
wasteful effort.
81.

STALLMAN,

supra note 26, at 125.

82. Id.
83. BAKER, supra note 57, at 9.
84. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 115.
85. Id.
86. Kazaa is a software file sharing program which allows users to directly transfer
files over a computer network without a central management system. Kazaa-The
Guide, http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/new-p2p.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). In order
to run Kazaa, the user must accept and install third-party advertisement software. About
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software in audio CDs.87 Companies often employ this software without
the user's informed consent, causing the buildup of excess software and
exposing the host computer to exploitable security risks. 88 Even with
detection, malicious software is often impossible to completely uninstall
since the source code of the offending program is sealed by a proprietary
vendor. 89
The above policies motivated Stallman to create the GNU project
and reject the underlying premise of proprietary licensing. 90 However,
Stallman's free software vision could not be complete without a
procedure to enforce free distribution within the software development
community. 9'
Under the Berne Convention, 92 software is automatically
copyrighted by the author when the software is fixed into a tangible
medium.93 In the context of computer software, this is usually when a
developer begins writing the program's source code to a file. 94 Still, a
copyright holder may abandon her exclusive right over a work by
disclaimer.95 Once the copyright has been disclaimed, the software is in
the public domain and may be considered free software.96
Ad-Supported Kazaa, http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/faq/howis kazaa_free.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006). This advertisement software "pops-up" advertisements based on
the users web browsing habits. Id. To stop the advertisements the user must uninstall the
advertisement software and Kazaa. Id.
87. On November 21, 2005, the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") filed a
complaint against Sony BMG alleging the company included uninstallable copyprotection software on over twenty million audio CDs that installs without the user's
knowledge or consent and silently runs in the background preventing unauthorized
ripping and copying of Sony BMG CDs. Sony Complaint, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRMV
Sony-BMG/sony-complaint.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Sony Complaint].
EFF alleges this software exposes the user's computer to various security risks and
silently transfers personal information to a central server including a unique code that
identifies the album currently playing, HTTP header information identifying the current
user's operating system and web browser, and the user's IP address. Id. 26, 32, 45. On
Jan. 6, 2006, a U.S. District Court gave preliminary approval to a settlement arising from
EFF's complaint. Judge Grants Preliminary Approval for Sony BMG CD Settlement,
EFF BREAKING
NEWS,
Jan.
19,
2006, http://www.eff.org/news/archives/
2006_01.php#004302 (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
88. Bob Sullivan, FederalSpyware Crackdown Continues but Relieffor Consumers
May Be Slow in Coming, MSNBC, Oct. 12, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6228258/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
89. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 115.
90. See generally id. at 115-26.
91. Id. at 89.
92. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 6,
1886, S. Treaty Doc. No 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and
amended in 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
93. Berne Convention, supra note 92, at art. 5(2).
94. LEGAL ASPECTS OF FSD, supra note 37, at 5.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:4

The practice of copyright disclaimer is the simplest method of free
software distribution, 97 but software in the public domain is left
unprotected.98 Since software in the public domain is not copyrighted,
"any nontrivial modification made to the work is fully copyrightable." 99
Thus, although software released in the public domain is initially free,
subsequent developers may choose to re-license modified versions.100
Without a mechanism for legal enforcement, the free software
community would dissolve because participants would lose any incentive
to contribute back to the community.'0 1 Thus, Stallman10 3devised a way to
' 10 2 licensing.
protect free software-through "copyleft"
2.

Licensing Schemes

In 1984, Stallman distributed a copyright disclaimed program to10 a4
proprietary vendor who in turn extended and improved the software.
After the vendor refused to allow Stallman access to the modified
program's source code, he created
the first copyleft license: the GNU
05
General Public License ("GPL").1
Today, the GPL is one of many free software and open source
licenses, 1 6 but it is still by far the most popular in the free software
community. 10 7 The most widely adopted version (version 2) of the GPL
was promulgated by Stallman in 1991.108 After significant community
input and numerous drafts, the next generation GPL (version 3) was
released June 29, 2007.109 While the release of GPL version 3 is highly
97. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 89.
98. Id.
99. LEGAL ASPECTS OF FSD, supra note 37, at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Copyleft licenses use copyright law to ensure that every person who receives a
copy of a work, can use, modify, and also redistribute the work. STALLMAN, supra note
26, at 89-90.
103. Id. at 89.
104. Richard M. Stallman, Address to the Int'l Lisp Conference: My Lisp
Experiences and the Development of GNU Emacs (Oct. 28, 2002).
105. Id.
106. The Open Source Initiative has approved over fifty open source licenses. Open
Source Initiative-Licensing, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2006). Other popular open source licenses include: Berkley Source Distribution License,
GNU Lesser GPL, Mozilla Public License, and Sun's Common Development and
Distribution License.
107. GPL v3 Gets Nearer: "The World's Most Popular Free Software License" Is
Being Updated, LINUXWORLD MAG., Jan. 20, 2006, http://linux.sys-con.com/read/
172405.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
108. LEGAL ASPECTS OF FSD, supra note 37, at 93.
109. Stephen Shankland, GPL3 First Public Draft Due Early 2006, ZDNET NEWS,
Aug. 9, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5826016.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2005); see GNU General Public License-Version 3 (2007), available at
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significant to the open source community, its provisions have not been
widely adopted as of the publication of this comment. Therefore, the
discussion will be limited to the relevant portions of GPL version 2.
a.

The GNU General Public License

The GPL is a self-propagating, irrevocable software license that
expressly protects the fundamental freedoms of free software." ° Its
purpose is "to guarantee [the] freedom to share and change Free
The license governs only the protections afforded by
Software.""'
traditional copyright law, copying, distribution, and modification, but it
the user's ability to execute a program licensed under
does not restrict
2
the GPL. 1
The GPL permits distribution of verbatim copies of a program's
source code in any medium. 113 It allows the licensee to charge "for the
114
physical act of transferring a copy" but not an actual license fee.
Because copyright law grants copyright holders the exclusive right to
create "derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,""' ' the GPL
only restricts a licensee's right to copy and distribute derivative works of
software licensed under the GPL. 116 Thus, if a licensee modifies a
program licensed under the GPL and creates a derivative work, that
licensee may only copy and distribute the modified version under the
terms of the license.' 1 7 Any program that is not a derivative work is not

http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt (last visited July 2, 2007).
110. STALLMAN, supra note 26, at 89-90.
111. GNU General Public License-Version 2, pmbl. (1991), available at
(last visited July 2, 2007)
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.txt
[hereinafter GPL v.2].
112. Id. §0.
113. Id. §1.
114. Id. §§, 2(b).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a derivative work." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The definition of a derivative work in the software context is quite
muddy. There are three competing tests among the divided circuits. See Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying a three-part
abstraction, filtration, and comparison test); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35
F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the analytic dissection test to determine whether a
program is a derivative work); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st
Cir. 1995) (adopting a standard where a "method of operation" cannot determine whether
a program is a derivative work).
116. GPL, supra note 111, §§2-3.
117. Id. § 2(b).
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included under the terms of the GPL." 8 Therefore, a software vendor
may distribute her proprietary software bundled alongside software
licensed under the GPL with no restriction on her proprietary license.' 19
Generally, a program in executable format constitutes a derivative
work of the source code because executable object code is merely a
systematic translation of human-readable source code to machinereadable object code. 120 Thus, the GPL also restricts a licensee's
distribution of binary executables. 12' The GPL allows for the generation
of binaries, but also ensures transferees receive access to the binary's
source code. 22 In order to distribute the program in an executable
format, a licensee must accompany the distribution with (1) "the
'
complete machine-readable source code,"123
(2) "a written offer ... to
give any third party... a complete machine readable copy of the
corresponding source code," 124 or (3) in the case of a non-commercial
distributor,
an offer and information received from the previous
1 25
licensee.
Users of software licensed under the GPL are not required to accept
its terms. 126 Acceptance is only required to copy, modify, or distribute
the software.1 27 If, for any reason, a licensee copies, modifies,
sublicenses, or distributes the program in violation
of the GPL's terms,
28
then that licensee loses all rights under the GPL.1
Since Stallman's release of GPL version 2 in 1991,129 countless
others have developed competing free software licenses. 130 The GPL,
however, has continued to serve as the industry standard of the free
software community through its maintenance and enforcement of free
software practices and commitment to the social and political goals of
the free software movement. 13 Thus, the GPL serves as the definitive
manifestation of the free software ideal and an essential tool for free
118.

Id.§2.

119. Id.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. See also TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 10 (providing
copyright protection for software without regard to its form).
121. GPL, supra note 111, § 3.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 3(a).
124.
125.

Id. § 3(b).
Id. § 3(c).

126. GPL, supra note 111, § 5.
127. Id. § 5.
128. Id. § 4.
129. See generally id.
130. See Open Source Initiative-Licensing, supra note 106. (approving over 50 open
source licenses).
131. Eben Moglen & Richard Stallman, GPL Version 3: Background to Adoption,
FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., June 9, 2005, http://www.fsf.org/news/gp13.html/ (last visited
Jan. 23, 2006).
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software distribution.
While GPL version 2 has achieved global use through its minimal
implementation of the Berne Convention's requirements, its developers
were largely concerned with its application under U.S. law. 13 2 GPL
version 3 intends to ease the "arbitrary trajectory" of free software across
international borders, transforming the license into a universal copyright
instrument. 133
More now than ever, developing countries have a viable option for
implementing free software into government infrastructures, but what
interests drive them to such an underground alternative? The next
section will briefly highlight the development and current status of the
international intellectual property system and explain the difficulties that
arise for developing countries in a harmonized intellectual property
world.
B.

The Development and CurrentStatus of the International
Intellectual Property System

The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") was
established in 1970 as the successor to the United International Bureaux
for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which administered the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.13 4 In 1974,
WIPO joined the United Nations as a specialized agency in charge of
administering intellectual property matters. 135
Currently, WIPO
continues to administer the Paris and Berne Conventions as well as
twenty-one other international intellectual property treaties among its
36
183 Member States.1
Functionally, WIPO serves to increase general intellectual property
awareness by encouraging creators to obtain protection and generating
public respect for intellectual property rights and assets. 37 Additionally,
the organization seeks to develop a responsive legal framework for
protection that facilitates innovation and creation and embraces emerging
technologies and national policy objectives. 38 WIPO enhances the
accessibility and affordability of international protection systems by
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. WIPO-General
Information,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/gib.htm#
P15_2065 (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Medium-Term Plan for WIPO Program Activities, http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm#strategic (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
138. Id.
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assisting developing countries in creating the infrastructure necessary to
support intellectual property protection. Finally, WIPO also maintains
monitoring systems that evaluate the current status of the organization's
efforts. 13 9

The development of TRIPs began with the negotiations at the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") in 1986.140 The GATT forum provided the United States with
greater leverage in negotiations as compared to WIPO, where the United
States had been frustrated by a large number of opposed developing
GATT
countries utilizing the WIPO one-state-one-vote policy. 14'
negotiations, on the other hand, operated on the principle of consensus
advantage over
where the United States could achieve substantial
42
developing countries because of its market size. 1
Ultimately, TRIPs emerged from the Uruguay Round as a powerful
feature of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 143 establishing a compromise between developed and
developing countries. 144 In exchange for ceding stronger intellectual
property protections and flexible foreign market investment
regulations, 145 "less developed countries obtained.., lower tariffs on
textiles and agriculture and protection against unilateral sanctions
imposed by... developed countries via the [TRIPs] mandatory
settlement process."1 46 Through TRIPs, the WTO could harmonize the
applicability of current intellectual property agreements, provide
adequate standards and appropriate enforcement procedures concerning
trade-related intellectual47 property rights, and provide effective dispute
settlement procedures. 1
Currently, WIPO and the WTO are the two principal organizations
that share authority over international intellectual property lawmaking.
Actual boundaries between the competencies of the WTO and WIPO are

139. Id.
140. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1626
(1986).
141.

JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,

GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION

566

(2000); Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 1154 U.N.T.S. 437 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979).
142. Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and
WTO: Regional Trajectoriesof Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 232 (1997).
143. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
144. Yu, supra note 3, at 385.
145. Id.
146. Id; see TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 66(2) (providing the technology transfer end
of the TRIPs bargain).
147. TRIPs, supra note 1, at pmbl.
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not definite, but a division of power has emerged based on functional
lines. 148 While WIPO manages existing international agreements, assists
developing countries with compliance, and studies new forms of
protection, the WTO focuses on intellectual property lawmaking through
the implementation and enforcement of international
agreements and the
49
supervision of dispute settlement mechanisms. 1
1. Legal Obligations for Member States of WIPO and WTO
Relating to Software
The TRIPs minimum standards for copyright protection are largely
imported from the Berne Convention; 150 however, select provisions from
the Paris and Rome Conventions also apply. 51 TRIPs provides computer
software with the same copyright protection as other literary works under
the Berne Convention, whether in source code or binary form. 5 2
Similarly, WIPO affords a computer program protection, regardless of its
mode or form of expression,
identical to literary works under Article 2 of
53
Convention.'
Berne
the
Under the Berne Convention, authors possess the "exclusive right
[to] authoriz[e] reproduction of [their literary and artistic] works, in any
manner or form."'' 54 Literary works are afforded protection automatically
upon the work's creation and are not subject to any formal registration
with the national government. 55 Protection lasts at least an additional
fifty years after the death 56
of the author and may last longer depending on
the country's preference.'
TRIPs also adopted from the Berne Convention certain limited
exceptions to copyright protection.' 57 Member States may limit the
exercise of the copyright holder's exclusive rights in "special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
' 58
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder."'
In addition to its expansion of international copyright law, TRIPs
148.
149.
150.

Heifer, supra note 5, at 25 n.104.
Id.at 25.
TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 9.

151.

Id. at arts. 14, 15.

152.

Id. at art. 10.

153.

World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty art. 4., Dec. 20,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 69 [hereinafter WCT].
154. Berne Convention, supra note 92, at art. 9(1).
155. Id. at art. 5(2).
156. Id. at arts. 7(1), 7(6). See also TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 12 (providing a term
of 50 years from the date of publication or making when the term is calculated based on
the life of a natural person).
157. TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 13.
158. Id. at art. 13; Berne Convention, supra note 92, at art. 9(2).
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widened the scope of patentable subject matter to incorporate all types of
technologies "provided that [the invention is] new, involve[s] an
inventive step and [is] capable of industrial application."159 Patentability
is enjoyed "without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field
1 60
of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.
This standard completely disposes of the threshold inquiry in traditional
U.S. patent law requiring an invention to fall into one of four categories:
"process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"'1 61 and instead
jumps to an analysis of the invention's novelty, utility, and obviousness.
TRIPs also provides several exceptions to the general rule of
patentability. 162 First, a Member State may exclude an invention which it
finds necessary to protect ordre public or morality, "including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment. ' 63 Additionally, Members may exclude qualified methods

for the treatment of humans or animals and certain organisms and
biological processes. 164 Further, as clarified by a Declaration on TRIPs
and Public Health adopted at Doha,1 65 Members always have "the right to
grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which such licenses are granted," 166 as provided by TRIPs under
Article 3 1.167
2.

The Impact of TRIPs on Developing Countries

TRIPs became generally effective on January 1, 1995, one year after
the creation of the WTO. 168 TRIPs extended the obligation to enforce its
standards "to the entire WTO membership, including many developing
states whose previous commitment to intellectual property was
nonexistent or at best equivocal."'' 69 Unlike WIPO and previous
159.
160.
161.

TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 27(1).
Id. at art. 27(1).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

162.

See TRIPs, supra note 1, at arts. 8(1), 27, 31.

163. Id. at art. 27(2).
164. Id. at arts. 27(3)(a), 27(3)(b).
165. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
166. Id.
167. See TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 31 (allowing Members to permit unauthorized
use of patented inventions "in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency").
168. Id. at art. 65(1).
169. Helfer, supra note 5, at 23; see also Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property
Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Optionsfor Developing Countries 1 (South
Centre, Working Paper No. 5, Oct. 1999), available at http://www.southcentre.org/
publications/workingpapers/wp05.pdf (last visited July 2, 2007) ("[I]n most developing
countries mechanisms aiming at controlling restrictive business practices or the misuse of
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international agreements governing intellectual property, "TRIPs could
not be shirked through partial implementation"'' 70 and "promised
71
meaningful enforcement rights within national legal systems.'
Additionally, TRIPs adopted GATT's powerful dispute settlement
system, providing the WTO with the power to sanction treaty
72
violations.1

In light of these strict enforcement procedures and the "economic,
financial and administrative"'' 73 difficulties developing countries would
encounter in the complete overhaul of their intellectual property systems,
TRIPs granted the developing and least-developed Member States
additional time to become compliant with its provisions.1 74 However, as
the transition periods have approached and expired,175 additional
problems have surfaced for developing countries other than the mere
76
administrative costs predicted by the WTO.1
Today's "knowledge-based" economy is no longer driven by the
agricultural and manufacturing industries, but instead by intellectual
property in the form of information technology. 177 Thus, developing
countries have lost their end of the TRIPs bargain because "gains ...in
178
the areas of agriculture and textiles will not make up for the losses
sustained from stronger intellectual property protections. 79 Further, as
intellectual property rights are weak or non existent.") [hereinafter Options for
Developing Countries].
170. Helfer, supra note 5, at 23.
171. Id. at 23. See TRIPs, supra note 1, at art. 41(1) ("Members shall ensure that
enforcement procedures.., are available under their law so as to permit effective action
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement .. ").See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) (allowing the U.S. Trade Authority
to "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement
concessions to carry out a trade agreement with [any] foreign country" whose act or
policy "violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of ...any trade agreement").
172. TRIPs, supra note 1,at art. 64(1).
173. Id. at art. 66(1).
174. See id. at arts. 65(2), 66(1) (offering developing countries an additional four year
transition period and least-developed countries an additional ten years to become
compliant).
175. The last transition period was due to expire on January 1, 2006. Id. at art. 66.
176. This is not to say that administrative problems have not surfaced. Indeed, the
transition periods provided by TRIPs have proved unrealistic for even some developed
countries, and much more so for most developing countries. See Poorest Countries
Given More Time to Apply Intellectual Property Rules, WORLD TRADE ORG., Nov. 29,
2005, http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2006) (discussing the seven and a half year transition period extension granted to leastdeveloped countries).
177. Yu, supra note 3, at 385.
178. Id. at 385-86.
179. Id. But see id. at 396 (explaining that some "[d]eveloping countries such as the
Dominican Republic view the inclusion of stronger [intellectual property] protection as a
costless choice" favoring increased trade or development aid).
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Peter Yu explains, the underlying assumptions of TRIPs may be
fundamentally incompatible with developing country concerns:
As many scholars have demonstrated both empirically and
theoretically, the presumption that stronger protection will benefit
less developed countries or that a universal regime will maximize
global welfare is questionable. Equally doubtful is the assumption
that the existing international intellectual property regime strikes the
appropriate balance between incentives to future production, the free
flow of information, and the preservation
of the public domain in the
180
interest of potential future creators.
Additionally, the very nature of the TRIPs dispute settlement
procedure has left developing countries in an impotent position:
Developing countries, as weaker partners, are at a double
disadvantage. If a developing country balks at a panel or Appellate
Body ruling in [favor] of a developed country complainant, it has to
face sanctions and pressures by a more powerful country from the
North. If, on the other hand, the latter balks at a [judgment] in
[favor] of a developing country complainant, a developing country is
hardly in a position to mobilize and exert the necessary pressure to
force compliance or to retaliate.181
The suspicion arising from developing countries' inherent weak position
is compounded by the uncertainty created from the lack of WTO
precedent relating to dispute settlement proceedings. 182 This void
requires developing countries to implement TRIPs standards without
83
guidance on how to safely work within the treaty's boundaries. 1
Most of the opposition raised by developing countries concerns
their interest in maintaining technological development. 184 Developing
countries fear the strong protections of TRIPs will impair their access to
technology, thereby curbing their ability to "encourage innovation and
creativity"' 185 while decreasing their competitiveness in the marketplace
and their ability "to promote public interest goals such as health,
180. Id. at 390-91 (footnote and internal quotations omitted).
181.

SOUTH

CENTRE,

ISSUES

REGARDING

THE REVIEW

OF THE WTO DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 34 (South Centre, Working Paper No. 1, Feb. 1999), available

at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/workingpapers/wp01.pdf (last visited July 2,
2007).
182. CALESTOUS JUMA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBALIZATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (1999), http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/

cidbiotech/dp/discuss4.PDF (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, Declaration of Principles, WSIS Doc. WSIS03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E

42 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/dms-pub/

itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004! !MSW-E.doc (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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nutrition and environmental conservation."'1 6 At the same time,
developing countries desire to protect their intellectual property interest
in "traditional knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the
conservation of biological diversity,' ' 87 which they insist is open
to
88
exploitation and misappropriation under current TRIPs standards.'
Developed countries have exacerbated developing country concerns
by pushing "TRIPs-plus" bilateral agreements, increasing the TRIPs
standards, and obligating developing countries to implement provisions
before the expiration of transition periods. 189 Further, developed
countries have failed to fulfill their end of the TRIPs bargain through the
reduction of tariffs and subsidies in the agricultural and textile
markets. 190 At best, these developments cause developing countries to
worry that the public interest exceptions of TRIPs are being eroded.' 91
At worst, they
predicate the perception that TRIPs was a coerced
92
agreement.1
III. Open Source as a Viable Alternative for Developing Countries
Despite past successes defending issues in the WIPO forum and the
apparent rights-for-trade-benefits compromise accomplished by TRIPs,
developing countries have realized the agreement cannot
guarantee that [they] will develop a more effective intellectual
property system or the political values needed to sustain the system
during the transitional period. There is also no guarantee that the
benefits deriving from the transitional arrangement would
compensate for the economic and cultural losses caused by the
implementation of [TRIPs]. Even worse, as many less developed
countries are concerned, the transitional provisions do not prevent

186. JUMA, supra note 182, at 2.
187. The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 143, 31 I.L.M. 818, pmbl., available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbden.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) [hereinafter The Convention on Biological Diversity].
188. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity
and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
1, IP/C/W/459 (Nov. 18, 2005)
[hereinafter Developing Country Submission].
Specifically, developing countries
advocate the adoption of a mandatory disclosure requirement obligating patent applicants
to "disclose the source and country of origin of the biological resource and of the
traditional knowledge used in the invention," U.S. Submission, supra note 12,
2,
"evidence of prior informed consent through approval of authorities under the relevant
national regime," id., and "evidence of fair and equitable benefit-sharing under the
relevant national regime," id.
189. Heifer, supra note 5, at 24.
190. Yu, supra note 3, at 386-87.
191. JUMA, supra note 182, at 7.
192. Helfer, supra note 5, at 24.
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from imposing unilateral

sanctions on them.

Reacting to these post-TRIPs tensions and the inherent coerciveness of
the TRIPs negotiations and settlement procedures,' 94 developing
to advance their
governments have sought alternative methods
195
underrepresented economic and cultural concerns.
A.

Optionsfor Developing Countries to Promote Policy
Considerations

In the wake of TRIPs, developing countries have used measures
both inside and outside of the TRIPs framework to advance their public
interest goals and bridge the growing technological gap between
developed and developing countries. 196 With assistance from various
nongovernmental organizations and, to a lesser extent, intergovernmental
organizations, developing countries have promoted public policy
considerations via both hard and soft lawmaking initiatives in policy
areas which TRIPs failed to address specifically. 197 While this strategy
has proved to be successful in the introduction of nascent issues into
international fora, 19 8 it still leaves newly established "counterregime

by developed countries during
norms"'199 open to potential bastardization
20 0
process.
negotiating
TRIPs
the
Instead of working under the threat of marginalization,2 °1 some

193. Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual
Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators Business Strategists, and
InternationalRelations Theorists, 70 U. CN. L. REV. 569, 640 (2002).
194. Id. at 580.
195. See generally Heifer, supra note 5 (discussing attempts by developing countries
to introduce new intellectual property norms in alternative fora).
196. See Correa, supra note 169 (discussing the use of compulsory licenses by
developing countries as a viable option within the TRIPs framework); See Yu, supra note
3 (describing the potential for working outside the traditional international regime
through soft law and abandonment).
197. See Helfer, supra note 5, at 27 (discussing hard and soft lawmaking in
biodiversity, plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, public health, and human
rights).
198. Id. at 53.
199. Id. at 63.
200. See Yu, supra note 3, at 385 (describing TRIPs as coercive, imperialistic, and
one-sided); Declan Butler, Business Backlash Kills off Software Meeting, NATURE, Aug.
28, 2003 (discussing WIPO meeting addressing potential inclusion of open and
collaborative projects its future deliberations thwarted by trade and consumer groups and
government representatives). But see Helfer, supra note 5, at 63 (discussing several cases
where developing countries "have used different 'entry points' in the WTO and WIPO to
leverage proposals into the two organizations that they had helped to create in other
international regimes").
201. See Steinberg, supra note 142, at 232 ("[R]icher countries tend to be more
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developing countries have explored more permanent options to diversify
intellectual property law through practices wholly outside the
international intellectual property regime.20 2 Developing countries may
learn from the contractual techniques employed by corporations which
"improve on, supplement or enhance the protection provided by
[intellectual property] law., 20 3 Many corporate rights holders use "mass
market contracts, including shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses" ' 20 4 that
are "more restrictive than the default rules of copyright, [and bar] users
from engaging in acts that would otherwise be permitted under
exceptions and limitations to rights.,2 0 5 Developing countries could
adapt this practice as a mechanism to control intellectual property in a
way that encourages their policy directives while working outside the
influence of developed countries. 6
B.

An Open Solution: Strategiesfor Developing Countries

News of governments specifically endorsing open source is no
longer "the exception rather than the rule., 20 7 Initiatives to mandate the
use of open source in government are active in Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, France, Italy, Peru, and Venezuela.20 8 Other
governments including Bahrain, Belgium, China, Costa Rica, France,
Germany, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Philippines,
and South Africa have declared a policy of preference for open source
software.20 9
Leading experts have matured in their recognition of the global
impact of open source as "not only a useful and significant tool.. . but
clearly [holding] the potential to help democratization and help find
solutions to the most pressing problems faced by the populations of

powerful in trade negotiations than poorer countries" and "[use] their power to exert...
pressure on international trade ... rules, coercing poorer countries into accepting [the
richer countries' agenda].").
202. Yu, supra note 3, at 406.
203. Shira Perlmutter, Convergence and the Future of Copyright, 24 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 163, 170 (2001).
204. Yu, supra note 3, at 406.
205. Perlmutter, supra note 203, at 170.
206. See Yu, supra note 3, at 408.
207. Catalin Cosovanu, Piracy, Price Discrimination, and Development: The
Software Sector in Eastern Europe and Other Emerging Markets, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 165,
229 (2003); see Robin Bloor, The Government Open Source Dynamic, IT-ANALYSIS.COM,
Jan. 7, 2005, http://www.it-analysis.com/technology/content.php?cid=7668 (last visited
July 2, 2007) ("There is currently a remarkable amount of proposed legislation world
wide that mandates the use of Open Source in government.").
208. Bloor, supra note 207.
209. Id.
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developing countries. '' l As one advocate puts it, "[I]t is not just
software, it is an economic knowledge production model, it is a social
change tool, an adaptation [sic] and survival tool for digital revolution
and knowledge societies.", 211 The growing appreciation for global open
source solutions emerges not only in words, but is reflected in projects,
such as GPL version 3, which facilitate the incorporation of open source
into the existing legal structures of developing countries, 212 and
coordinated international events, which educate these countries about the
advantages of open source.213

Through these growing developments, emerging countries seeking
to create their own norms, principles, and procedures in intellectual
property protection should find a potential solution involving several
coordinating steps. First, developing countries should embrace the ideas
of Richard Stallman. In the same way Stallman hijacked copyright
licensing to "copyleft" his works to ensure the security of free software,
developing countries should use license agreements to advance public
policy concerns.
For example, consider the interest of developing countries in
protecting the cultural and intellectual heritage of their indigenous
peoples.214 Advocates of indigenous rights fear that unprotected access
to indigenous knowledge and materials might "lead to biopiracy that
could jeopardize the heritage and culture of indigenous communities-or
worse, threaten the very survival of these communities. '' 21 While
developing countries continue to bargain for specific protections from
TRIPs, 2 16 they should encourage indigenous communities to adopt

210. Frederick Noronha, Developing Countries Gain from Free/Open-Source
Software, LINux JOURNAL, May 20, 2003, http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6884 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006).
211. Arturo Martinez, Open Source, A Development Option, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON OPEN SOURCE SYSTEMS (2005), available at

http://oss2005.case.unibz.it/Papers/48.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
212. Eben Moglen & Richard M. Stallman, GPL Version 3: Background to Adoption,
June 9, 2005, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.fsf.org/news/gpl3.html/ (last visited
Jan. 23, 2006).
213. See OSS 2005-The First International Conference on Open Source Systems,
http://oss2005.case.unibz.it/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2006); GUADEC 2005-GNOME User
and Developer European Conference, http://2005.guadec.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2006);
see also O'Reilly
Radar, http://radar.oreilly.com/archives/2005/12/venezuelaopen-source.html (Dec. 6, 2005) (mentioning the Third Worldwide Free Knowledge
Forum in Venezuela in 2005).
214. World Intellectual Property Organization, Indigenous People, Cultural Heritage
and Intellectual Property, Leaflet No. 14, http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/
publications/docs/indileafletl2.doc (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
215. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2005).
216. Developing Country Submission, supra note 188.
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licensing schemes similar to that of the GPL-schemes which would
facilitate the communal aspects of indigenous culture, but prohibit or
regulate commercial exploitation. 1 7
The development of a licensing system outside of the WTO forum
would allow indigenous communities to directly regulate the conduct of
commercial actors. 2 ' 8 Through such a system, indigenous communities
could ensure commercial actors have prior informed consent of the
2 19
community before exploiting indigenous knowledge or materials.
Additionally, a licensing system could be used to achieve equitable
benefit sharing between indigenous communities and commercial
actors.220 Indigenous communities could not only use licenses to control
monetary compensation, but to monitor and control how the relevant
traditional knowledge or material is being used commercially. 22 ' Most
importantly, a licensing system could serve as a protected international
forum for developing countries to advance these norms, principles, and
values through international commercial course of dealing.
Though licensing schemes will provide indigenous communities
direct control over traditional knowledge and material, there may be
concern over whether such private regulation is practically enforceable
against international actors.222 It is true that licenses may contain "choice
of forum, choice of law, or international arbitration provisions relevant to
cross-boundary dispute or enforcement issues, '223 however, there is no
guarantee a chosen forum will enforce foreign obligations not expressly
regulated by that forum's law.2 24 Even if not fully enforceable, a license
system would be a viable method of adjusting international norms while
217. Regulation might be a variant of that suggested by the Bonn Guidelines. See
Access and Benefit Sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, Decision VI/24, in Report
of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, U.N. Environment Programme, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, at 262, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (May 27, 2002),
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006)
(providing national strategies for countries interested in implementing the access benefitsharing of the Convention on Biological Diversity).
218. See U.S. Submission, supra note 12,
18 (advocating the benefits of the
development of national laws outside of the international patent system to "achieve
objectives of obtaining appropriate access and benefit-sharing" of traditional knowledge
and folklore).
219. Id. 19.
220. Id. 20.
221. Id.
222. See Developing Country Submission, supra note 188, 4 (noting difficultly in
enforcing foreign contractual obligations for acts not prohibited in country where it is to
be enforced).
223. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Article
27.3(B), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of
TraditionalKnowledge and Folklore, 16, IP/C/W/449 (June 10, 2005).
224. Developing Country Submission, supra note 188, 4.
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developing
countries work for specific enforceable protections through
225
TRIPs.
At the same time, developing countries should embrace open and
collaborative research communities, 226 similar to the open source
software community, as "part of a broader knowledge optimization
strategy" 227 to attract foreign investment and build a domain of public
knowledge. 8 Such communities are growing in popularity, especially
in the biomedical field, and not only produce usable and reliable data,229
but attract follow-up projects allowing "a more coordinated and
comprehensive attack on large, complex problems than does traditional
[research] .,230
Additionally, developing countries should expand the public domain
by patent mining and providing useful ideas to local research and
development companies. 23' After the TRIPs extended transition period
expires, such use will require a license and be relegated to
noncommercial research, but, whenever possible, developing countries
should employ compulsory licensing to facilitate access to information
and knowledge.
Finally, developing countries should continue to push mandates to
employ open source software in government institutions. This solution
will not only be cost effective,2 32 but could instigate the nation's software
industry. 33 Further, because of its unique customizable nature, open
source systems facilitate public access to information by accommodating
any language. 234 Developing countries may also find open source

225. Developed countries equate restrictions ensuring the protection of indigenous
knowledge and material to those which ensure safety and efficacy, environmental
protection, and domestic or national security. U.S. Submission, supra note 12, 7. Thus,
developed countries see the protection of indigenous knowledge and material not as a
TRIPs issue, but as a national policy choice. Id.
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Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 530 (2005).
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232. See Marson, supra note 23 ("Buying Windows XP and Office XP on
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single-user license fee in the US of $7,541 and $48,011 respectively.").
233. Id.
234. See id. (comparing an OpenOffice project to implement all 11 South African
languages with Microsoft Office, which accommodates one South African languageEnglish).
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software attractive because of its independent and transparent nature.
Many countries fear that proprietary software developers write backdoors
into software allowing unauthorized access to secure government
systems. 236 Whether this fear is rational or not, 2 3 7 developing countries
find comfort in systems running open source software where the source
code may be scoured for bugs.
These methods do not aim to be complete strategy for survival postTRIPs, 238 but rather to present the most independent and autonomous
strategies for developing countries while they continue to push
underrepresented agendas in the difficult international negotiating
processes.
IV. Conclusion
Developing countries may breathe easier now that the WTO has
extended TRIPs transition periods for compliance with its minimum
standards. This development does not, however, change the fact that
time will eventually run out for developing countries. Now is the time to
be inspired by revolutionary projects such as the open source movement
and to implement inventive strategies that may help ease the burdens
created by TRIPs. As negotiations continue at the WTO for a legitimate
revised TRIPs agreement, 239 one that would embrace the norms,
principles, and rules of the entire WTO membership, developing
countries should use existing legal tools, such as private license
agreements, to protect their volatile intellectual assets from unwanted
exploitation and advance their own standards of protection on a
commercial level creating customary practices which may in turn work
to evolve the international norms of protection.
As developing countries continue the struggle against the
oppression of more developed countries,2 40 they must remember that
"[w]hen people speak of ideas that revolutionize [sic] society, they do

235.
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237.
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238. See Gervais, supra note 227, at 530 (providing additional recommendations for
developing countries).
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but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one
have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even
pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence. ' 24 '

241.

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).

